The Earth’s Population – What is the Real Problem?

by Reginald Finger, MD, MPH

In many countries the aging of the population and the dearth of births is likely to precipitate a human resource crisis.

For the last several decades, the threat of overpopulation has dominated the discourse on global demographics. Most policy debate has reflected the underlying assumption that reducing birth rates is important for the preservation of the Earth’s resources and of an acceptable standard of living. Now, however, birth rates have fallen well below the replacement level in two of seven world regions and are approaching it in four others. Only in Africa do birth rates remain high, and on that continent the population picture is distorted by the HIV epidemic. Though there is an upper limit to the population the Earth can sustain, and conservation of planetary resources is important, we show here that in many countries the aging of the population and the dearth of births is likely to precipitate a human resource crisis. This, not overpopulation, is the key demographic issue. Policy options that preserve the sanctity of human life are discussed.

Background
Scholarly as well as public opinion about population growth has shifted through the years. For many centuries, large families were the norm in most societies, partially because infant and child mortality rates were high and parents wanted to assure that their family lines would survive. Parents were concerned lest no one be available to care for them when they became older. With the advent of the industrial revolution, children began to cost more to support than they could repay in labor – in contrast to the dynamic that prevailed on the family farm. In addition, however, modern methods of birth control were not available, and any serious attempt to limit fertility within marriage would be perceived as interfering at least to some extent with a couple’s sexual relationship.

In the late 18th century Thomas Malthus sounded a contrasting note. He observed that the global population total was leaving its centuries-long pattern of gradual linear growth and beginning to “take off” – that is, to follow an exponential curve. Because supplies of food, land and other resources were limited, Malthus foresaw dire social and economic consequences for nations, particularly mass starvation, if the population trend were not reversed.¹ Though we may disagree with some of Malthus’ scenarios, he did get people to think. The line of reasoning of his essay, not too popular for about 150 years following its publication, suddenly took hold in the 1960s and 1970s. By then, death rates had fallen, life expectancy was up, and global population was definitely rising at a rate that could clearly not be sustained indefinitely.² U.S. government³ and United Nations⁴ theorists and some academics took the overpopulation threat to its extreme and predicted global catastrophe and security risks to our nation if something was not done quickly to control world population growth.⁵ Paul Ehrlich made the same case in his bestselling book, The Population Bomb.⁶ With newly developed contraceptive technologies now in the arsenal, U.S. policymakers advocated for aggressive family planning programs both in this country and overseas.⁷

About that time, though, birth rates began to fall sharply and have continued downward since. In the last decade, the total fertility rate has dipped below the replacement level (2.1 children per woman) in two of six world regions and is rapidly falling toward that figure in three others.⁸ Though total global population is still increasing rapidly (currently 6.5 billion), demographers project that it will peak at somewhere between 7 and 12 billion about mid-century and then decline.⁹ The United Nations’ “medium variant” projection for 2050 (the approximate peak year) is 9.3 billion.¹⁰ Ben J. Wattenberg of the American Enterprise Institute, in his detailed and astute analysis Fewer, published in 2004, believes population will peak at a considerably lower level, perhaps 8 billion.¹¹ Wattenberg cites several reasons for the decline – among them the global tendency for people to move from farm to city, where children are of less economic benefit; education and work outside the home for women; increases in divorce, abortion, and contraceptive use; and the tendency to marry at older ages.¹²

Current Circumstances
To some it might seem pragmatic to deal with the global population problem by simply setting a target for the worldwide total fertility rate. With such a proposal, this rate would be calculated to result in a plateauing of global population at a level environmental experts say the planet can sustain. Countries could then be urged to aim up or down for that rate. This idyllic solution, however, ignores several complicating factors and, in fact, would fail to solve an even more pressing demographic problem – the aging of the population – which will be discussed below.

The different world regions have experienced very different sets of circumstances. Here is a brief review of each, based on available data from the years 2000-2005:¹³

Note: The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is defined as the average number of babies born to women during their reproductive years.

North America has a TFR of 1.9 (below replacement level), down from 3.5 in 1950-1955, which was the height of an especially potent “baby boom.” The total population continues to grow more rapidly than fertility might suggest, because of a moderately large immigration stream from most other parts of the world. The factors associated with declining fertility – increased education, economic opportunities for women, and easy access to contraception – have been especially prevalent in North America for several decades.

Europe has the globe’s lowest TFR at 1.3, down from 2.7 in 1950-1955. Left with much destruction and social upheaval following World War II, Europe had a much smaller baby boom than experienced in North America. Europe also takes a smaller immigrant stream, mostly from Africa and the Arab countries. In addition to sharing America’s educational and economic causes of lower fertility, more advanced secularism in Europe may be playing some role.

Latin America and the Caribbean: Despite the predominance of the Roman Catholic faith in much of this region, TFR has also fallen here, from 5.9 in 1950-1955 to 2.5 currently. (As in other regions, better education and economic opportunity, and access to contraception are factors here.) Many of the same factors are at work here as elsewhere, as well as dramatically improved survival for children because of Latin America’s excellent progress in public health. Paradoxically, for unknown reasons, the fall in fertility has been somewhat slower in the more economically advanced “southern cone” countries.

Oceania: Not as much has been written about fertility in Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific islands, but trends generally follow those of North America. TFR was 3.9 in 1950-1955 and is 2.4 now. Because of the region’s overall smaller population, trends here have little impact on the direction of global demographics.

Asia: The world’s largest and most populous continent has at least three different demographic scenarios going on at once. In China, the largest nation at 1.3 billion people, the fertility rate is below replacement at 1.8, compared to over 6.0 in the early 1960s. In addition to the educational and economic factors, China had a coercive one-child policy in place for two decades. Side effects of this policy now include a looming economic crisis for the elderly (China has no national social security system) and a “bride shortage” brought on because couples responded to the one-child policy in some cases by selectively aborting female unborn infants. However, even in Taiwan and South Korea, which had no such policies, fertility has fallen similarly. Japan has a demographic similar to Europe, seeing a TFR decline that started earlier and has proceeded farther. Elsewhere in Asia, including India, the fall in fertility is similar to that seen in Latin America, for most of the same reasons. Continentwide, the TFR was 5.9 in 1950-1955, and 2.5 now.

Africa is the only continent whose TFR remains high – 5.0 now, compared to 6.7 in 1950-1955. The educational and economic causes have been weakest here, yet the trend is still in the same direction in Africa as elsewhere. This continent, however, faces a far different problem. In this region, the working-age population is being depleted not by a falling number of births, but by deaths from HIV infection.¹⁴ This virus infects and kills primarily adolescents and young adults. Africa’s life expectancy may decline by 15 years from its peak before prevention and treatment successes begin to reverse the trend. This factor will constrain growth of Africa’s total population and prevent it from making a significant impact on global totals.

For more information, see U.N. Demographic Trends.

Projections
For the next few decades, Latin America and Asia will enjoy what might be called a “demographic dividend” – there will be relatively small fractions of elderly and children at the same time, and larger numbers of young and middle-age adults. Economic productivity will increase, and these regions may gain in global influence. By contrast, Europe and North America will soon experience a consequence more severe and immediate than overall depopulation: the aging of the population. For most of history, the numbers of elderly were quite small compared to other age groups. Those too old or medically unable to participate in the work force could easily be supported – earlier by family members, and more recently by social security systems that fund retirements through ongoing taxation of current workers. This "pay-as-you-go" system works nicely so long as fertility rates are high and the population is growing. However, when fertility rates have been low for a few decades, the number of active workers per retiree begins to shrink. Levels of benefit to the retired population cannot be sustained without an unacceptable burden placed on the fewer remaining workers. We are speaking here not just about social security checks, but about all sorts of other goods and services older people find more difficult to provide for themselves. Families begin to find themselves choosing between providing for their aging parents or for their children. ¹⁵

Asia and Latin America are likely to experience the same problem a few decades later. Africa, by contrast, will be – in fact, already is – burdened not so much with elderly (there are fewer of them) but with orphans needing someone to care for them.

Large scale immigration – replenishing populations in very low fertility-rate countries from those that are higher – is clearly not a sufficient solution either. Any nation, to preserve its identity, needs a younger generation racially and culturally connected to its history. Further, the economic disparities between host and immigrant populations are such that most nations would have to place limits on immigration at some level in order to survive economically.¹⁶ Wattenberg notes, however, that on balance, immigrants are a net benefit to the receiving country, because they typically come in as young adults, already raised and trained, and will not cost retirement benefits for several decades.¹⁷ To the United States, in addition, immigrants have brought a desire to work and a variety of traditions that have made us a culturally richer nation.

Policy Options
Do global population trends constitute a problem that requires policy intervention, or not? And if so, what sort of intervention would help?

In public policy as in medicine, a guiding principle is “First of all, do no harm.” The harm to society that we mention here is that which results from violating the sanctity of human life. By tolerating abortion of unborn children by the millions, particularly in North America, Europe and China, we have first of all eliminated a large group of young citizens who now and in the future could be helping to support our elderly. Second, we have instilled a “culture of death” that has taken us well beyond the notion of reasonably limiting family sizes, to becoming “anti-child” altogether.

Euthanasia is a moral evil and societal curse that provides no solution either. It appears in overt forms such as physician-assisted suicide and also in more subtle manifestations such as consigning elderly to low-cost facilities that skimp on needed care. The resulting devaluation of human life, far from solving the problem of excess elderly per worker, introduces an undercurrent of death and fear throughout the country, outweighing any possible economic benefit.

In addition to avoiding abortion and euthanasia as policy options, countries could implement incentives for families to bear children: tax breaks and adequate investment in schools would help. Middle-age and elderly voters would need to be convinced to vote for these measures as an investment in future generations – often not an easy sell. In addition, countries could work on initiatives to enhance agricultural production, and to protect the water supply and the environment, in order to help assure that upper limits on the capacity to support global population are not reached prematurely.

Indeed, Malthus was partly right; there is a limit on how many people the earth can handle. It’s just that in most of the world, we are currently threatened more by consequences of low fertility than the opposite.

People are a valuable and necessary resource.

Read Stephen Adams' "Endangered Species" on the Citizen Webzine.

If you enjoy reading stories like this one, sign up for the free CitizenLink Daily Update e-mail. You'll get news and commentary from Focus on the Family Action delivered right to your computer.